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Abstract
The behavior and stability of over-the-counter markets is of central concern to regu-
lators. Little is known, however, about how the structure of these markets determine
their properties. In this paper we consider an over-the-counter market populated by
boundedly rational heterogeneous traders in which the structure is represented by a
network. Stability is found to decrease as the market becomes less well connected,
however, the configuration of connections has a significant effect. The presence of
hubs, such as those found in scale free networks increases stability and decreases
volatility whilst small-world short-cut links have the opposite effect. Volatility in
the fundamental value increases market volatility, however, volatility in the riskless
asset returns has an ambiguous effect.
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1 Introduction
Over-the-counter (OTC) markets are key to the operation of the modern financial system.
Much of the world’s trade in derivatives, foreign currency, and many other assets, is
conducted in these exchanges. They provide flexibility to financial institutions, however,
this comes at a cost. During adverse conditions, their decentralized nature can cause
traders to be unable to identify counter-parties and as a result the markets may lose
liquidity and fail. This happened during the 2008 financial crisis when the sparse structure
of OTC markets was blamed for a lack of transparency and an inability for institutions
to identify prices of assets and to trade (Brunnermeier, 2009). As a result this has led
to calls for trade to be moved away from OTC markets towards centralized exchanges
to increase stability. There is, however, very little work comparing these two types of
institutions. This paper aims to address a key aspect: the stability and dynamics of
prices. In particular it will look at how the pattern of interactions between institutions,
the structure of an OTC market, affects the market behavior. The markets considered
in this paper will contain heterogeneous speculative traders which base their trading
decisions on their valuation of the asset. Each trader’s valuation is itself dependent on
their strategy and the information the trader gains through trading with its counterparts.
As a result the structure of the market will affect the behavior of traders.
OTC markets allow investors to trade assets directly between each other rather than
through centralized exchanges. They are particularly prevalent when assets are illiquid,
are traded in very large quantities or when there is scope for bespoke contracts. The largest
OTC markets are those for currency exchange and swaps. In these markets investors buy
or sell directly from dealers, however, each customer may only know a subset of the dealers
within the market, limiting their ability to observe the best price. The dealers themselves
trade with each other in order to balance inventory , meet liquidity needs and speculate,
again however, each dealer may only interact with a subset of the other dealers. Lyons
(1997) captures this interaction in a formal model and shows that this market setup can
reduce the amount of information in prices. Duffie et al. (2005) show how constrained
trading opportunities and search costs in OTC markets affect prices and the resulting
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bid-ask spread, whilst Koeppl et al. (2012) use a mechanism design approach to examine
the effect of the clearing arrangements (centralized versus bilateral) on stability in both
types of markets.
Inter-bank lending markets also generally operate on an OTC basis. In this case the
‘price’ is the interest rate at which a bank or financial institution may lend or borrow. The
nature of the contracts (length of borrowing, size of borrowing, time) and the participants
(credit ratings of borrower, history, etc.), all affect the interest rate a particular institution
will be offered. An OTC structure provides the flexibility necessary for this type of trade.
Theoretical studies have shown that the linkages between banks (lending and borrowing
relationships) have an important effect on stability (Allen and Gale, 2000). Several papers
have considered the effect of particular network structures e.g. Battiston et al. (2012);
Georg (2013); Iori et al. (2006); Ladley (2013); Lorenz and Battiston (2008) and have
shown that the connectivity (the number of links between traders in the network) and
the configuration of linkages both play a role in market stability.
The structure of OTC markets, as defined by the interactions of the institutions within
them, may be highly complex. Network theory, offers an effective analogy to capture and
analyze their detail. An OTC market may be represented as a graph in which nodes
correspond to traders and edges represent potential trading relationships. Within the
network each financial institution is restricted only to interact and gain information from
those to whom it is directly connected. Seminal work by Watts and Strogatz (1998),
Baraba´si and Albert (1999), Newman (2003) and others have provided tools applicable to
a wide range of systems, from friendship groups to gene regulation which may be employed
in this setting.
Within this paper we represent the OTC market as a network. The traders within the
market follow one of two strategies which differ in their estimation of future market prices.
Chartists look at previous trends in the market price to extrapolate future price changes,
whilst fundamentalists know the true value of the asset and assume that the market price
will move back towards this value. We use numerical simulation in order to analyze the
behavior of the model. The results show that the market structure has a significant effect
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on price dynamics and market stability. The more heavily a market is connected, i.e. the
more easily information may flow between traders, the more frequently stable dynamics
are observed. As the number of connections is reduced, the market dynamics deviate more
often from the fundamental, as sections of the market diverge in their valuation of the
asset. The presence of hubs increases stability whilst the inclusion of ‘small world’ type
short-cut connections has the opposite effect. Markets are also shown to be less stable
if they contain an above average number of chartist traders. Volatility in the underlying
fundamental or riskless asset returns are amplified by the network structure, particularly
the locally connected market. In some markets, however, low levels of riskless asset return
volatility were found to synchronize the traders and reduce price volatility. Overall, the
model is found to have much in common with the underlying Chiarella (1992) model in
terms of the parameter combinations which lead to non-equilibrium prices and the effect of
those parameters on the amplitude of cycles, although the network structure has marked
influence on this.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses literature relevant to our model.
Section 3 details the model of the interaction of heterogeneous traders in OTC markets.
Section 4 presents the results, first focusing on the behavior of individual traders and
then looking at the role of the number of connections, network structure, parameters,
compositions of traders and volatile fundamentals. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
The analogy of a network has been used in a body of work looking at the effects of market
structures on trade.1 Evstigneev and Taksar (2002) show that equilibria within these
markets exist and that the networks formed can maximize overall efficiency (Kranton and
Minehart, 2001) although Gofman (2011) shows that with insufficient numbers of connec-
tions an inefficient allocation becomes almost certain. The dynamics of these markets are
also highly dependent on network structure, e.g. Bell (1998) and Tassier and Menczer
(2008). Both the number of connections and the pattern of connectivity play important
1See Wilhite (2006) for a review.
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roles. For instance, Wilhite (2001) shows that ‘small world’ connections, those connect-
ing otherwise distantly separated sections of the market, have a large effect on reducing
search costs. The behavior of traders within these markets has also been shown to vary
with their location (Ladley and Bullock, 2008). Importantly, this is not just dependent
on their trading opportunities but also on their information linkages (Ladley and Bullock,
2007). Babus and Kondor (2012) considers how information diffuses across OTC markets
showing that with private valuations the information efficiency of prices is maximized
when all traders trade with all others. Information linkages may also be external to the
market. Panchenko et al. (2013) examine this issue explicitly. They extend the model
of Brock and Hommes (1998) to allow traders to adopt one of two strategies based on
the choices and performance of a trader’s social network. By basing this adoption on a
network of connections the stability of the system is changed.2
As described above, and in a similar manner to Panchenko et al. (2013), we ground
our work in the literature of market dynamics under heterogeneous beliefs. The dynamics
of centralized exchanges with chartist and fundamentalist traders have been considered
in detail.3 Chiarella (1992) presents one of the first versions of this type of model in
which the interaction of these two types of speculative traders leads to a range of market
dynamics. This class of models has been employed to answer a range of questions relating
to market structure. For example: Westerhoff (2004) uses a chartist/fundamentalist
model to examine trade in multiple markets. Anufriev and Panchenko (2009) contrast
centralized and order book market mechanisms. Lux (1995) examines the effect of herding
behavior whilst Chiarella et al. (2009b) examine the dynamics of boundedly rational
traders within an order book market. Diks and Dindo (2008) investigate information
costs, whilst Westerhoff (2003) looks at the role of transaction taxes. Here we extend this
line of reasoning to examine the dynamic stability of OTC markets.
2A separate area of the literature examines OTC markets through search based models - see for
example Duffie et al. (2005, 2009); Lagos and Rocheteau (2009).
3See Hommes (2006) and Chiarella et al. (2009a) for summaries.
5
3 Model
We analyze a model in which boundedly rational chartist and fundamentalist speculators
trade an asset in an OTC market. The majority of previous work using these types
of traders has considered a single centralized exchange in which all traders are able to
interact. Consequently trading opportunities and information are unconstrained and flow
freely across the market. Here we consider OTC markets where this is no longer the
case. We model a market architecture in which traders may only interact with a subset
of individuals, their trading contacts. Each trader may only buy or sell the asset with
these contacts whilst their estimation of the future asset price is based on the prices of
their recent transactions. As such, different traders within the market may have access to
different trading opportunities and information sets and so may have differing valuations.
The underlying behavior of the traders in this model is based on those of Chiarella
(1992). There are, however, several key difference which we discuss below.4 The Chiarella
model captured the behavior of boundedly rational speculative traders, in a relatively
simple setting. This makes it an appropriate base on which to consider the potentially
complex effect of the OTC network structure on market dynamics and speculative trade.
Other models have included factors such as wealth constraints or strategy switching which
could have interesting and important effects. We leave these additions to future work and
focus here on understanding the effect of the the key element of the OTC market: the
structure.
3.1 Markets and Prices
We represent an OTC market architecture as an undirected graph where traders are nodes
and trading connections are edges. There are N traders in the market where L is the
connection matrix. We denote by L(i, j) the potential connection between trader i and
trader j with L(i, j) = 1 if they are connected and L(i, j) = 0 if they are not. For
all traders L(i, i) = 0. Traders may only interact with those individuals to whom they
are directly connected on the network. Here, we restrict our analysis to networks which
4For reference, a description of the Chiarella (1992) model is included in Appendix A.
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consist of a single component, i.e. there exists a path between all pairs of traders in the
market. Whilst an individual trader’s direct interactions are limited, through its indirect
connections (neighbors of neighbors etc.) a trader may affect the entire market. Dis-
jointed networks are excluded as without connections separate components would behave
independently.
To capture the nature of interactions in OTC markets we model traders as acting
asynchronously. In a centralized exchange the presence of a single auctioneer, or order
book, provides some degree of coordination by spreading information to all traders si-
multaneously. In an OTC market, however, there is no equivalent. Traders are only
connected to a subset of other institutions and so will not receive all information. As a
result, without a central coordinating device, it is natural to think of participants act-
ing asynchronously. The model, therefore, proceeds as a series of discrete time steps, in
each of which a single trader is selected at random with uniform probability to act. Be-
tween periods in which they are chosen traders gather information and respond to trades
initiated by other individuals.
A second key difference between centralized exchange and OTC markets is the mech-
anism of trade. In a centralized exchange all trade occurs through a single mechanism
giving all traders access to the same trading opportunities and prices. In contrast, in OTC
markets trade occurs directly between pairs of traders. As a result there is not a unique
price at which all exchange occurs. Rather, prices vary across the market depending on
the valuations and demands of the traders in a particular neighborhood. In the Chiarella
model a price was determined for all traders by the market maker who updated the price
based on excess demand. In this model we depart from the notion of a centralized price,
and the associated market maker adjusting prices, and instead define trader i’s local price
at time t to be P ti .
Given the local nature of trades and information, a trader’s local price is based on
information gained from the trades in which they have participated. We model this as
the volume weighted average price (VWAP): the total value of all trades the trader has
participated in since the last time they were chosen, divided by the total quantity traded.
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This value is frequently used in practice in real financial markets as an estimate of the
current price based on recent trades. Note, in line with Chiarella (1992) we use log prices
throughout. For a trader who has participated in K trades since they were last chosen,
VWAP is:
P ti =
∑K
k=1 pkqk∑K
k=1 qk
(1)
where pk and qk are the log price and absolute quantity of trade k. If there are no trades
during the period the trader maintains the previous valuation. This may occur if K = 0,
i.e. the trader was chosen twice in a row, or if qk = 0, no trade occurred because all of the
traders partners have the same valuation (for instance if they were all fundamentalists).
It is important to note this is the traders estimate of the local price. It is not a price at
which the trader can necessarily trade, unlike that defined by the market maker in the
Chiarella model. Details of how trade prices are determined are given below.
3.2 Traders
As in Chiarella (1992) the market is composed of two varieties of trader chartists and
fundamentalists. The type of each of the N traders is determined at the start of the
simulation and remains fixed throughout. Both types of traders take positions to speculate
on the future price movements of the risky asset. We model trader’s holdings of this asset
as being short term - traders consume their positions every time they act.5 Chartist
traders also base their decisions on the return on a riskless asset, such as a government
bond which has a specified return. Like Chiarella (1992) the trade of this asset is not
modeled.
Fundamentalists believe that the asset price will return to the fundamental value.
Fundamentalist trader i values the asset at the logarithm of the fundamental value V ti =
W and their demand for the asset is proportional to the difference between this value and
5As such traders do not trade based on their previous portfolio. This would require a considerably
more complex model, however, it is an important direction for future research.
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the logarithm of the trade price, p:
Di(p) = a(W − p) (2)
where the constant a determines how strongly the traders demand is driven by the differ-
ence between the price and the fundamental asset value, W (note: we write this demand
function in terms of W , to match Chiarella’s notation, however, W could be replaced by
V ti ). Like Chiarella, we assume this is common to all traders.
6 Fundamentalist demand
therefore increases in magnitude as the price moves away from the fundamental.
Chartist traders do not have access to, or do not choose to use, the asset’s fundamental
value. Rather trader i’s prediction of the future price is based on a simple linear assessment
of the trend in the local logarithmic price, ψti
ψti = ψ
tl
i + c(P
t
i − P tli − ψtli ) (3)
Inline with the asynchronous nature of this model traders only update their local price and
trend when they are chosen to act. Time t is the current time, whilst tl was the previous
time the trader was chosen. The trend is calculated by an exponentially weighted moving
average where the constant c expresses how quickly the chartist’s assessment of the current
trend is driven by recent price changes. Based on this, at time t chartist i’s valuation of
the asset, V ti is the current local price plus the trend:
V ti = P
t
i + ψ
t
i (4)
The chartist demand function is then given by the difference between this price and the
trade price:
Di(p) = h(V
t
i − p− g), (5)
6In reality this may not be the case, fundamentalist in different parts of the market could disagree on
the assets true value. We leave this extension to future work.
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where g is the return on a riskless asset and h is defined as:
h(x) =
1
1 + e−4bx
− 0.5 (6)
h increases monotonically, has a single point of inflection and well defined lower and
upper bounds limx→±∞ h(x) = ±0.5. Moreover h(0) = 0. The steepness of the sigmoid is
parametrized with b where b > 0.7
Chiarella explains this function in terms of chartists wishing to maximize their inter
temporal utility of consumption. Traders have the choice of allocating their wealth be-
tween the risky and riskless asset. In line with Merton (1971) demand is proportional to
the difference in returns. In this case proportional to the difference between the return
the trader will gain on trading at a particular price and the return on the riskless asset.
If g > 0 and the trade price is only a little below the traders valuation i.e. V ti − p < g,
the predicted return on the risky asset is sufficiently low for the trader to prefer to short
the risky asset and go long in the riskless asset. As the trade price increases the size of
the short position increases, whilst if the trade price decreases the trader may take a long
position. This demand, however, is bounded above and below by non-modeled constraints
such as available wealth or maximum permissible risk level.
3.3 Trades
Once the chosen trader has established their valuation the trader trades with each of their
trading contacts in turn. Like Chiarella (1992) this model does not consider wealth or net
positions and traders have no budget constraint. 8 Traders aim to establish speculative
positions with their counter parties based on their short term beliefs about the future
asset price movements. Transactions occur directly between pairs of traders and each
transaction is independent of all others. Each trader pair (i and j) has an estimated
valuation of the asset (Vi and Vj) and a demand function (Di(p) and Dj(p)), which gives
the traders’ demand at price p relative to their valuation. The form of these demand
7The arctan function has the same properties and produced qualitatively similar results.
8In the context of traders who can offset positive and negative positions with different partners this
becomes a much more complex strategic decision.
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functions is given above, both are monotonic in the price p and give positive demands
when the price is below the trader’s valuation and negative demands when the price is
above. Since both functions are monotonic, for any pair of valuations there exists a price
such that Di(p) +Dj(p) = 0. At this price the quantity traded is q = |Di(p)| = |Dj(p)|.
This is an equilibrium price at which demand and supply (negative values of the demand
function for the trader with higher valuation) are equal and in general the trader with
higher valuation sells to the one with lower valuation. It is also the price at which the
total expected profit, summed over the two traders, and calculated from each trader’s
price expectation, is maximized. As such, at any other price-quantity pair both traders
could increase their expected profits by making a second simultaneous trade for additional
units at the equilibrium price. We, therefore, set the quantity traded as the equilibrium
quantity. We abstract from the details of the bilateral negotiation and assume this volume
is traded at the equilibrium price. In a real OTC market traders could trade multiple units
at different prices based on their preferences and bargaining power. Modeling this process,
however, would require further assumptions regarding individual preferences which would
complicate this model and move it away from the underlying Chiarella model.9
In each time step the model proceeds as follows: 1) A single trader is selected at
random. 2) The chosen trader calculates the local price using Equation 1. 3) The chosen
trader forms their valuation of the asset V ti . For fundamentalist this is the fundamental
value, for chartists this is given by Equation 3. 4) The chosen trader trades with each and
every one of their contacts in turn. The price and quantity of each trade are determined
by the intersection of the demand functions of the traders involved (Equations 2 and 5, as
appropriate). It is important to note no other traders update their valuations in a given
step except for the chosen trader.
9Other ways of determining the trade price, such as taking the mid-price, were tested but had little
qualitative effect on the results.
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4 Results
The model set out above is considered under a range of experimental settings. The effect
of connectivity (the number of links between traders), the configuration (the pattern of
the connections), the composition (the distribution of types of traders in the market) and
volatility in the underlying fundamental price and riskless asset return are all examined.
Statistics are collected between steps 10000 and 30000, giving time for the model dynamics
to settle down and avoiding initialization effects. In all cases, unless otherwise stated, the
fundamental value W = 0 and the return on the riskless asset g = 0. In all simulations
there are 100 traders in the market and each trader starts with the same estimate of the
asset price, P 0i = 0.05.
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4.1 Market Behavior
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
In order to understand the behavior of the model we first focus on two examples which
demonstrate the possible dynamics. In each case each trader in the market is a chartist
or fundamentalist with equal probability. In Figures 1 and 2 we plot the price paths of
two simulations. In both cases the parameters are a = 1.0, b = 4.0 and c = 1.0 and the
market is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph (see Appendix B for details of the construction
of these graphs). In Figures 1 the probability of any pair of traders being connected is
0.1 whilst in Figure 2 it is 0.6. In both cases the network is connected (the threshold for
this to be the case in markets of 100 traders is approximately 0.04).
Figure 1a shows the average of all traders log valuations between periods 10,000 and
30,000. This includes the heterogeneous valuations of the chartists and the homogeneous
valuations of fundamentalists.11 A cyclical dynamic is clearly present. There is some
10This is a common initial state in the literature, however, it has little qualitative effect on the long
term dynamics presented below. We considered initial over and underestimates of the price as well as
distributions around the true value.
11A smoothed measure of the trade price has similar dynamics.
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variation at the peaks and troughs of the cycles but generally the cycles appear smooth.
This cyclical pattern is driven by the interaction of the two trader types. Fundamentalist
traders wish to buy the asset for prices lower than the fundamental and sell if for prices
above. As such their demand encourages the price to move back towards the fundamental.
If chartist demand is strong enough, the trend, resulting from a reversion initiated by
fundamentalist may overshoot the fundamental and result in a further mispricing. As
this new mispricing increases, fundamentalist demand also increases resulting in a higher
proportion of trade at prices closer to the equilibrium price and so local prices which are
closer to the fundamental. This in turn reduces the size of price changes and reduces the
trend until it reverses and the process starts again. The cyclical dynamics may be related
to the bubbles and crashes frequently seen in financial market. Individuals join trends,
creating bubbles and overpricing until a point at which the asset is sufficiently overvalued
for the trend to reverse and a crash occur. This may then result in a period of under
pricing before investors again realize this and reverse the trend.
These cycles occur in a setting where not every trader is connected to every other.
One of the results of this is the noisy peaks to the cycles. Connections in the market
maintain a degree of synchronization, however, different parts of the market may change
price at different speeds. The gradual reaction of traders may be seen in Figure 1b.
The individual valuations of chartists generally follow the trend, however, they frequently
depart, increasing when others are decreasing and vice versa. This is driven by the
network. When there is a reversal in trend most chartists will identify this through the
changes in the demands of their neighbors. The incomplete structure, however, means
that chartist traders may occasionally be out of step with others in the market, predicting
increases when all others are predicting the reverse. Similarly some chartists will be
connected to relatively greater numbers of fundamentalists and so experience a greater
demand for the asset towards the equilibrium price. These deviations in valuations create
volatility in prices as observed in Figure 1c.12 This figure shows that whilst the average
12Note, in this example, the trade prices tend to be further from the equilibrium than the average
valuation because chartists react more strongly to price difference than fundamentalists, i.e. they have a
steeper demands function (b > a).
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valuation appears smooth the trade price is much more volatile due to traders differing
in their valuations of the asset. Chartists differ from fundamentalists and chartists, with
different neighbors and trade histories, differ between themselves. The differences seen
in Figure 1b also affect trade volumes. Figure 1d shows the trade volume over the same
period. The moving average indicates that trade volumes increase as valuations deviate
from the fundamental and decrease when they are close. Fundamentalists always value
the asset at the fundamental, therefore, the greatest average deviation between chartists
and fundamentalists is at the peaks of the cycle. This divergence in valuations leads to
more trade which in turn reduces as valuations move closer together.
Figure 2a shows a separate case in which the market is better connected and where the
model converges to a steady state at the fundamental price. The average valuation exhibits
a decreasing series of cycles. Individual valuations (Figure 2b) follow a similar pattern
to that seen in Figure 1b but also decrease over time. The higher degree of connectivity
means that fundamentalist traders are able to damp the trends created by the chartists
traders early in their development, ensuring that the market converges to the steady state
at the fundamental value. They are able to do this because the higher connectivity means
that a relatively high proportion of traders are connected to a fundamentalist who act
to bring the price back to the fundamental. For lower levels of connectivity there will
be areas of the market with very high proportions of chartists which sustain mispricings.
At the same time there will be areas mainly composed of fundamentalists who without
chartist connections have little effect. Over time the variation in the trade price decreases
(Figure 2c) and as the cycles are damped (Figure 2d) the trade volume goes to zero in
the steady state. When connectivity is lower fundamentalists are unable to do this -
instead chartists can build up local trends which spread through the market leading to a
divergence in trade prices and non-steady state dynamics.
In this paper we focus on the dynamics of trade prices as these are representative of
the opportunities available to traders within the market. The average valuation, whilst
illustrative, is not a price at which any trader is necessarily able to trade. In the remainder
of this paper we associate the type of volatility seen in Figure 1c with market instability
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and the steady state at the fundamental price, as seen at the end of the period in Figure 2c,
with stability. Volatile trade prices indicate that the market has not converged to the
equilibrium valuation whereas a constant trade price indicates the opposite. It should be
noted that in nearly all cases the steady state is the equilibrium price, the only exception
is the extreme market composition consisting of no fundamental traders - in which case
no trade occurs and trader valuations are never updated.
The dynamics of the average valuation were investigated. For the parameter regions
considered in this paper we did not observe patterns in the average valuation which
appeared chaotic. These patterns were only observed when c > 2, however, c is a moving
average parameter and so is not economically meaningful in this range. This lack of
chaotic behavior may at first appear strange to those used to models of chartists and
fundamentalist. The trade price, however, should be the main focus. Empirical financial
data and models of this type are principally concerned with the market price at which
trade occurs rather than average valuations. Examination of trade prices in this model is
therefore more natural and the volatile nature of this is in line with real world data. The
smooth pattern in average valuation is not readily comparable to market data.
4.2 Connectivity
Each trader within the market is connected to a number of trading contacts. As this
number increases the trader may enter more trades, gaining a better picture of local trends.
If every trader is connected to every other, the market essentially becomes a centralized
exchange in which all participants have access to the same opportunities. Several papers,
particularly in the inter-bank market literature, have considered the effect of connectivity
e.g. Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Ladley (2013). These papers have shown how the
collapse of one participant may spread through the network of credit linkages and affect
the remainder of the market. A potentially significant question, which has received little
attention, however, is how the connectivity of markets affects the dynamics of prices. It
is this issue we address here.
We consider markets based on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs with connectivity’s in the
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range 0.05 to 1.0. For each connectivity 1000 random networks are generated (see Ap-
pendix B for details) and 100 repetitions of the simulation for each network are run.
Multiple repetitions are important because there is path dependence. Due to the net-
work structure, the order in which traders are selected may influence the market dynam-
ics. Markets consist of 50 chartists and 50 fundamentalists. Any network consisting of
more than a single component is rejected and regenerated. We initially present a single
parametrization of the model (a = 1.0, b = 4.0, c = 0.7). These values exhibit diverse
dynamics, however, for a large range of other parameter combinations the behavior is
qualitatively similar. In Section 4.3 we examine the sensitivity of the model to these
parameters.
In this section we are principally interested in the number of runs which arrive at
stable, steady state dynamics vs. the number that do not. In analyzing the simulations
we use a simple test to identify those runs which achieve a steady state. Steady state
dynamics are defined as those in which the sum of squared price changes is less than
10−6.13 In later sections we go on to investigate how the market structure affects other
quantities of interest such as volatility and price deviations from the fundamental value.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 3 shows the percentage of runs which exhibit stable dynamics for different levels
of market connectivity. There is a clear pattern: as markets become more connected their
dynamics change. They exhibit more stable behavior. Increased connectivity means that
traders have more trading partners. As such chartists will tend to be more synchronized
in their trends and fundamentalists will have more opportunity to bring deviations back
towards the fundamental. As a result, divergences are rare and the prices of traders across
the market will tend to converge. In less connected markets traders will have less partners
in common, producing more varied valuations and more divergence in trade prices. The
sparser connectivity will mean that in some areas of the market fundamentalist traders
13This value was chosen based on empirical observation. There is, however, a wide difference in this
measure between those runs achieving a steady state, which often exhibit values close to 10−12 and those
which do not, which often have values of 10−1 or higher. This measure was chosen for it’s similarity,
however, there are many alternative measures based on aspects, such as price dispersion, volatility etc.,
which give qualitatively similar result.
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will be a relative minority, and so prices away from the fundamental will be corrected
more slowly allowing cycles to develop.
The results, however, are not as simple as the average implies. Figure 3 also presents
the maximum percentage of steady states observed for a single market at each connectivity.
These results show that, whilst poorly connected markets exhibit steady states rarely on
average, this can vary a lot between market structures. For instance with connectivity
equal to 0.15 only 19% of the total observations are stable, however, in one case a market
exhibited steady state behavior 100% of the time. A similar story may be told for better
connected markets. With connectivity equal to 0.3 on average 6% of the runs are non-
steady state, however, one case exhibits non-steady state dynamics on 65% of occasions.
Whilst connectivity has a large effect on stability, the configuration of connections also
plays a role. The exact set of links between traders may allow information and trade to
flow freely and for fundamentalist traders to damp fluctuations. Alternatively they may
allow groups of chartist traders to deviate from the market and create disagreements in
prices. The next section will consider the importance of the configuration of connections.14
4.3 Configuration
The previous section showed that whilst connectivity is important in determining market
dynamics the configuration of the market also plays an important role. This finding
supports previous work in this area. Both Ladley and Bullock (2008) and Wilhite (2001)
find that small world type short cut connections can reduce search costs and make the
price formation process quicker, whilst Georg (2013) finds that the configuration of an
inter-bank market, not just the connectivity, is important in determining the susceptibility
to systemic shocks.
In this section, we investigate the role of the market configuration on price stability.
We consider seven fixed market architectures with similar numbers of connections (with
14An individual traders connectivity also effects how they may trade - better connected traders have
access to a larger fraction of the market. Due to the cyclicality of the price dynamics and the zero sum
nature of trade in this model all traders wealth’s have periods of being both positive and negative. This
means that whilst better connected traders trade more and so have more variable wealths, individual
connectivity has no effect on the average.
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one exception) but qualitatively different patterns of connections in order to identify
aspects of market structure, other than connectivity, that affect the dynamics of prices.
The type of each trader, chartist or fundamentalist, is determined at random with the
probability of them being a chartist Pc = 0.5. The parameters are a = 1.0, b = 4.0 and c
in the range 0.1...1.0. For each parameter combination we perform 100,000 repetitions of
the model.
The first network structure we consider is completely connected - all traders are con-
nected to all others. The second market architecture, core-periphery, has a completely
connected core, comprising a fraction of the traders. The remainder of the traders form
the periphery and are weakly connected to the traders in the core. The next two markets
have random patterns of connections. The first is a Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph whilst
the second is based on a scale free network. This means the structure is random but
the degree distribution, the distribution of node connectivity’s, follows a power law. The
fifth network structure is a torus in which each trader’s configuration of connections is
the same: each has the same number of partners connected in the same manner result-
ing in a homogeneous market structure. The final two structures relax the assumption
of homogeneity. The sixth market exhibits local connectivity, in this case groups of ten
traders form completely connected cliques. Each of these sub-markets, however, is only
weakly connected to the other groups. As a result sub-markets are homogeneous but the
market structure as a whole is not. The final structure introduces additional short cut
connections between sub-markets as seen in the small world network literature. These
connections allow trade between groups which would otherwise have been separated by
a large number of links. Details of how these networks are constructed are provided in
Appendix B.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
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We first consider the effect of configuration on the probability of steady state dynamics
and then present the effect on volatility and the difference between the market price
and fundamental. Table 1 shows the percentage of runs which achieve steady states for
different market configurations and values of c. In all cases when the market converges it
converges to the fundamental price. For all networks, when c is low the market is stable.
Chartists are relatively unresponsive to recent price changes and so regardless of the
market structure there are no trends established. As c increases, chartists become more
sensitive leading to potential deviations. The size of the deviations also increase. Tables 2,
3 and 4 show the average distance of trade prices from the fundamental, the volatility in
trade prices and the trade volume for those cases with non-stable dynamics. As traders
react more strongly to trends, this causes larger deviations from the fundamental and
greater price volatility. At the same time greater disagreement between the chartists and
fundamentalist traders increases the trade volume. The configuration, however, has a
strong effect on the pattern.
The core-periphery market may be viewed as a completely connected network with
additional periphery nodes attached. The effect of these traders are to make the market
less stable in comparison to the completely connected market. The periphery nodes only
have a single connection to the core, limiting the signals they receive. As a result their
prices may become disconnected from the rest of the market and result in them providing
a destabilizing influence. These nodes also increase the size of deviations and trade volume
even after controlling for the lower number of stable markets. In comparison to the Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi network with the same number of connection the core-periphery market is more
stable. The completely connected center reduces price divergences and allows a greater
proportion of steady state dynamics.
Both the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and scale free networks exhibit steady state dynamics less fre-
quently than the completely connected market. These markets also show higher volatility
and price deviations from the fundamental. Unlike in the completely connected market,
some traders are not directly connected and are therefore able to trade at different prices
leading to more volatility in trade prices and more frequent deviations from the funda-
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mental. There is, however, a significant difference between the two network types, the
scale free market shows stable dynamics more frequently and lower volatility than the
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network. This difference is driven by differences in the degree distribution of
the two networks. The scale free network is characterized by a greater number of hubs -
high connectivity nodes - relative to the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network. The hub traders connect
to large numbers of individuals across the market. As a result they provide a coordinating
influence, bringing the valuations of different traders together towards the fundamental
making them more stable and only slightly more volatile than a centralized market. This
coordinating role also leads to increased trade volumes (Table 4). The hubs are connected
to many traders which may have very different valuations. Trading with these individuals
results in large trade volumes both between the hub and the connected traders but also
between the connected traders and their connections who are not directly connected to
the hub. Maintaining coordination with traders not directly connected to the hub will
require constant trading across the market. In contrast in more homogeneous network
structures prices will tend to vary more gradually between neighbors resulting in many
small trades.
The torus network possesses approximately the same number of connections as both
random networks, however, exhibits higher volatility and steady state behavior less fre-
quently than either of them. Unlike the random networks, the structure of the torus is
homogeneous and connections are local in the sense that the distance between pairs of
nodes on opposite sides of the torus is very long. For instance in the case considered here,
100 traders each connected to 10 neighbors, the distance between some traders is 10 links.
This structure means that there can be substantial deviations in valuation in different
areas of the market. One area of the market could be exhibiting an upward trend whilst a
different, geographically distant area could be exhibiting a downward trend. The lack of
‘long range’ connections means that traders are unable to globally synchronize and bring
the market price back to the fundamental or even coordinate on a single price. As a result,
for relatively low values of c the market does not achieve a steady state. With traders
trading in random order the time series of trade prices will exhibit much higher volatility
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than any other structure. In this setting the lower trade volume seen for torus relative
to random networks may appear surprising, however, whilst there may be large global
deviations in price producing high volatility, local areas in the market may be relatively
coordinated meaning that trade volumes are low.
We focus in this section on the composition of the network with the level of connec-
tivity held (approximately) fixed. It should be noted, however, that the torus network
is particularly sensitive to the number of connections each trader has. A greater number
of connections reduces distances which makes the market more stable. In contrast fewer
connections lead to dramatic increases in volatility as different areas of the market become
less synchronized. This increase is driven by disconnections in the information flow in the
market. For instance the presence of a contiguous group of five or more fundamentalist
traders will prevent information about trends being passed across the group. If there are
two such breakages within a torus there will be two distinct areas of the market which
may synchronize on different trends. The presence of such breakages has been studied
in percolation theory. For instance Newman and Watts (1999) consider a similar model
for the spread of diseases. They calculate the number of breakages, B, in a ring network
of size X in which each individual has N connections as B = Xp(1 − p)N where p is
the probability of a node being susceptible to the disease. A disconnection in the market
occurs when B > 2 i.e. there are two breaks in the ring, separating the traders into two
groups. With Pc = 0.5 and N = 5 there are on average 1.56 of these breaks, however, for
N = 4 this increases to 3.13, i.e. the ring is broken on nearly all occasions. Our model
is more complex than that of Newman and Watts as nodes are not simply susceptible to
disease or not - fundamentalists still have an effect on prices and relative size of the clus-
ters has an effect on the market behavior. The presence of breaks, however, still reduces
coordination in different areas of the market and this effect becomes more marked as the
number of connections reduces. Other networks with random structures are much less
prone to have large numbers of disconnected traders.
The locally connected market is characterized by small groups of heavily connected
traders with few connections between them. Whilst this is similar to the torus network,
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in the sense that there are relatively long distances between traders, the results are very
different. The locally connected market is more stable, less volatile and has lower trade
volumes. Relative to the completely connected market, the locally connected market
exhibits a reduction in stability for low values of c but an increase for high values. The
statistics for volatility, price deviations and trade volume give an indication as to why this
occurs. These values are much lower than any other market, suggesting that relatively few
traders trade away from the fundamental value even during non-steady state dynamics.
At any given time most of the groups are in, or very near, the steady state. Deviations
may occur in some areas of the market and not spread beyond a single group. Some
segments may be less stable than others - perhaps containing a higher fraction of chartist
traders. As a result of this heterogeneity an individual section may deviate from the
fundamental more easily at lower values of c making the whole market more prone to non-
steady state behavior. For higher c, however, this relative effect is reversed. Whilst local
groups are increasingly prone to non-steady state behavior the limited connections mean
that fluctuations are often not spread throughout the market, whereas in a completely
connected network they would be. Relative to completely connected markets, cycles in
locally connected markets may be damped or eliminated more easily.
The addition of short cut connections to the local connections reduces stability. Rather
than enhancing the flow of information and therefore price stability, the cross linkages
instead let destabilizing prices changes spread more easily. The aspect of the structure
which meant that the locally connected market was more stable than the completely
connected market is weakened. This result is in contrast to that of Georg (2013) who
finds that small world markets are more stable than random networks. Similarly Ladley
and Bullock (2007, 2008) observe that short cut connections stabilize the market allowing
information to flow more quickly and so leading to faster price discovery. In this previous
work traders had pricing rules which did not permit trend following, instead traders
learned the asset price based on local information. In this paper the ability of traders
to respond to local patterns means that rather than stabilizing the market, the cross
connections can propagate mispricings. In all cases volatility, price deviations and trade
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volumes increase, indicating that whilst the links may spread or damp price deviations
the added connections involve more traders in this process resulting in more trades away
from the steady state.
4.4 Composition
In earlier sections all markets had, on average, equal numbers of each type of trader,
in reality, however, this will frequently not be the case. There may be some markets
which are dominated by fundamental traders, whilst others may have higher proportions
of chartist traders. There may also be variation over time as traders switch strategies,
e.g. Panchenko et al. (2013) or move between asset markets, e.g. Westerhoff (2004).
The probability of a trader being a chartist, Pc, is varied in the range 0 to 1. Connec-
tivity is varied between 0.05 and 1.0. For each connectivity level and composition, 1000
random Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks are generated. In each case 100 repetitions are performed
and the aggregate statistics reported. As before, the parameters are a = 1.0, b = 4.0 and
c = 1.0.
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Figure 5 about here.]
The effect of market composition is shown in Figure 4. More chartists traders generally
lead to less frequent steady state behavior. In markets with large numbers of fundamen-
talists, there is greater pressure to move the asset price back towards the fundamental
value producing, for large parameter ranges, a fixed price. This effect combines with mar-
ket connectivity such that even relatively highly connected markets with high numbers of
chartists exhibit non stable dynamics. For the market composed solely of chartists there
are no individuals able to identify the initial mispricings of the asset and so no price trend
develops resulting in a steady state being maintained.
Figure 5 demonstrates the effect of trader behavior by varying the three parameters
a, b and c for a range of markets architectures. For brevity we restrict out presentation
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here to three architectures: completely connected, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and locally connected.15
Each graph shows the percentage of runs for each parameter combination which result in
the steady state and the region in which the Chiarella model would exhibit steady state
behavior (those parameters for which 1
c
> b−1
a
). In all cases for low c non-steady state
dynamics are restricted to parameter combinations with low fundamental demand and
high chartist demand, i.e. when chartists only weakly follow trends, prices only deviate
from the fundamental if chartists have very strong demand (to push the weak trends)
and fundamentalists have weak demand (so they are unable to damp the trends). As
chartists react more strongly to trends (c increases) the non-stable region also increases
in size such that this dynamic is observed for lower levels of chartist demand and higher
levels of fundamentalist demand.
The completely connected market demonstrates the sharpest dynamics - a greater
fraction of the parameter combinations exhibit either all or no steady state behavior and
very few exhibit both. This is because the greatest source of variation, the configuration
of links, is identical across runs. The Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network exhibits a much larger region
of gray cells. The exact combination of random links effect the stability resulting in a
less precise, but larger, area in which both stable and non-stable dynamics are seen for
particular parameter combinations. The locally connected model is most sensitive to
changes in c, showing the largest area of steady state dynamics for low c and the smallest
area for high c. This indicates the significance of the local groups - if the strength of
trend following is weak even if there is a divergence from the equilibrium in one area, it
is unlikely to spread and may eventually be damped. If, however, c is high and trends
are able to develop, the local structure has the opposite effect reducing the ability of the
market to synchronize and damp prices.
The stable regions have similar shapes to those demonstrated in the Chiarella (1992)
model. The degree of correspondence is relatively high. Only for low a and b and high
c are non-stable dynamics observed for parameter combinations which would result in a
15The patterns for the other markets are qualitatively similar and are available upon request. Of
the remaining networks the long distances between some traders make the torus the most sensitive to
composition. A slight imbalance towards chartist may lead to volatility increasing by over an order of
magnitude where a similar effect would not be observed in other markets until Pc > 0.9.
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steady state in the Chiarella model. For high a and b, steady state dynamics are observed
in some cases when a steady state would not be found in the Chiarella model.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Chiarella (1992) also gives an analytic expression for the amplitude of cycles16, how-
ever, we have shown that the price process in the OTC model is volatile and does not follow
a simple cyclic pattern. In contrast the average of local valuations is cyclic and is linked
to the trade prices in that these values are used to construct trader valuations. Given the
different measures, market prices vs. average valuation, a direct quantitative comparison
is not possible, however, an examination of the relative effects of the parameters on the
amplitudes is still insightful.17
We estimate the amplitude as the difference between the maximum and minimum of
the average valuations within each run. The dynamics of the average valuation are suffi-
ciently smooth and regular that this is a reasonable estimate of the amplitude. Figure 6
shows these values for three networks and a range of parameter values along with the
calculated Chiarella model value. In line with the previous results for price volatility
the local network generally has a lower amplitude than the completely connected market
whilst the random network has a higher amplitude. The behavior of the model in re-
sponse to parameters a and c for all networks is in line with the theoretical predictions.
The parameter a leads to a reduction in amplitude as higher fundamentalist demand leads
to damped oscillations. Whilst an increase in the sensitivity to recent trends (increase in
c) leads to an increase in the amplitude. The effect of b is more complex. The numerical
calculations suggest this will have an ambiguous effect, sometimes increasing and some-
times decreasing the amplitude. For the OTC model, however, an increase in b nearly
always increase the size of the amplitude. Greater chartist demand creates stronger trends
and therefore greater oscillations. This difference in the relationships may be due to con-
straints on the derivation of the analytical formula underlying the theoretical predictions.
16This expression is presented in Appendix A.
17Furthermore, as Chiarella notes the formula for calculating the amplitude is derived through the
method of averaging and so is only valid for a limited range of parameters.
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Chiarella suggests that the amplitude increasing effect may dominate, however, this must
be interpreted with caution.
In addition to the network structure, the OTC model presented here and the original
model of centralized trade differ significantly in the representation of time: asynchronous
discrete updates vs. continuous time. The qualitative similarity in their behavior, both
in terms of the stable region and the response to parameter changes is, therefore, surpris-
ingly close. This suggest that the underlying equations governing trader behavior play
a very significant role. Whilst the market structure itself modulates the market dynam-
ics, the traders may be the dominant factor. It is particularly enlightening to compare
the completely connected market with the theoretical predictions in this setting. In the
completely connected OTC market everyone trades with everyone, effectively the market
becomes centralized. Differences in behavior are then principally due to differences in the
representation of time. In general this change makes the markets more stable - exhibiting
steady state dynamics more frequently. This may be understood by realizing that updat-
ing traders one at a time effectively makes the valuation process more gradual which acts
to smooth the overall market dynamics.
4.5 Volatile Fundamentals
Finally, we consider volatility in the underlying fundamental asset value and riskless asset
return. Previously both of these components were assumed to be constant, however, this
is not representative of real financial markets. In this section the fundamental price and
riskless asset return follow random walks. Both variables are updated after each trader is
chosen as follows:
W (t+ 1) = W (t) + σWη
t
W (7)
g(t+ 1) = g(t) + σgη
t
g (8)
where σW and σg control the scale of the volatility of the fundamental value and return
of the riskless asset and ηtW and η
t
g are standard normally distributed random variables.
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Initially W (0) = 0 and g(0) = 0. As before 100,000 simulations are conducted and the
parameters are a = 1.0, b = 4.0, c = 1.0 and Pc = 0.5.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 5 presents results showing the effect of volatility in the riskless asset return and
fundamental value on the volatility of the trade price.18 In nearly all cases, increases in
the volatility of the fundamental results in an increase in the price volatility by at least an
order of magnitude. This may be explained as follows - Traders are on average chosen once
every 100 time steps. The noise is normally distributed and therefore, to an individual
trader, the change in the underlying asset value between times they are active will scale
with the square root of this time span i.e.
√
100σW . Some markets, however, exhibit much
greater increases. The locally connected markets show the greatest increase in volatility.
This structure was previously shown to damp variations between the weakly connected
regions, however, changes in the fundamental price act to create shocks which effect all
areas, bypassing the weak connections. For instance, an increase in the fundamental
would create positive demand amongst all fundamentalists at the current market price
and therefore an upwards trend. The Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph and torus network show
almost flat patterns. It should, however, be noted that this is from a high starting point
and is subject to a very high standard deviation making reliable interpretation of a pattern
difficult.
The magnitude of the effect on price volatility should be an order of magnitude greater
than the volatility in the riskless asset for the same reason as given for the fundamental
volatility. In general this is the case, with some markets such as the locally connected mar-
ket exhibiting considerably greater increases. For the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and torus networks,
however, the results are more ambiguous. In both cases a large increase in the riskless
asset volatility increases price volatility and a small increase has the opposite effect. This
patterns is due to the presence of the riskless asset return in the chartists demand func-
tions. Changes in the riskless asset return have a common effect on the chartist traders.
18It may seem counter-intuitive that we consider cases where the riskless asset is more volatile than the
risky. This, however, aids clarity of explanation. The effects of the two volatility’s are additive. Tables
of data showing this are available from the authors upon request.
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When they increase (decrease) all chartist traders will tend to decrease (increase) their
estimate of the trend. This acts to increase the synchronization of chartist’s demands
and therefore prices across the network - reducing price volatility. A similar effect is
not observed for volatility of the fundamental because fundamentalists all have the same
valuation and are already coordinated. This only has an effect in the torus and random
networks which are relatively decentralized and in which prices diverge the most (as seen
by the high volatility in the base case). As the volatility of the riskless asset return in-
creases further the synchronization effect becomes secondary to the increase in underlying
volatility resulting in a general increase in price volatility.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the effect of the structure of OTC markets on the stability and
dynamics of prices. We have considered a model in which heterogeneous investors interact
with a subset of individual in the market and base their strategies on local prices. It was
found that the structure of an OTC market has a strong effect on the price dynamics.
As markets become less heavily connected, and trade is more constrained, the market
becomes less stable. The occurrence of steady states decreases and is instead replaced
by volatile prices. The sparseness of connections means that different traders within the
market may diverge in their estimates of the price and the fundamental traders are unable
to bring the price back to the fundamental.
Connectivity, however, is only part of the story, the configuration of the connections
and the composition of the market also play roles. Despite connecting distance areas of
the network small-world type short-cut links were shown to decrease stability - allowing
fluctuations to spread more easily. In random networks the presence of hubs leads to
lower volatility and more accurate pricing in scale free networks than the equivalent
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network. This was further confirmed in the torus market in which the large
distances between some traders results in the greatest volatility. The composition of the
market was also shown to play a role with greater numbers of chartist traders found to
be a destabilizing factor. The OTC market structures were found to amplify the effect of
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fundamental and riskless asset volatility, however, in some cases low levels of riskless asset
return volatility were found to reduce price volatility. Despite the influence of the network
structure the behavior of the model has much in common with the underlying Chiarella
(1992) model in terms of the relationship between parameters and stable behavior. This
was particularly true for completely connected markets - suggesting that highly connected
OTC markets may behave similarly to centralized exchanges. As connections are removed,
the relationship became less clear cut and the exact configuration of connections was found
to play a role.
Several aspects of this model invite future extensions. Here we focused on price dy-
namics and ignored aggregate trader positions and partner selection. An extension to
consider these aspects in detail would allow the inclusion of portfolio and leverage effects.
In this setting traders would be constrained in the size of the positions that they could
take based on their wealth. As a result, trader demand, and therefore market dynamics,
would be dependent on recent performance. A further extension would be to consider the
endogenous formation of the network structure. In this paper the network was specified
exogeneously, however, in reality traders may choose their connections. The model could
be extended to incorporate this feature and examine equilibrium network structures, in a
similar manner to Condorelli and Galeotti (2012), under speculative trade.
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A Chiarella’s Model
Chiarella’s (1992) model considers a market populated by two groups of traders - fun-
damentalists and chartists. The asset price P (t) is set by an auctioneer based on excess
demand D(t) as follows:
P˙ = D(t) (9)
where D(t) is the sum of fundamentalist D0(t) and chartist demand d(t):
D(t) = D0(t) + d(t) (10)
Fundamentalist demand is a linear function of the price difference between the market
and Walrasian equilibrium price (W (t)):
D0(t) = a(W (t)− P (t)) (11)
Where a controls the slope of the demand function. The chartist demand function is
given by:
d(t) = h(ψ(t)− g(t)), (12)
where ψ(t) is the chartist assessment of the current trend in P (t), g(t) is the return on
the riskless asset, and h() is a sigmoid function with the following properties: h increases
monotonically, has a single point of inflection and well defined lower and upper bounds.
Moreover h(0) = 0. The steepness of the sigmoid is parametrized with b(b > 0), indeed
b = h′(−g(t)). Assuming that the trading dynamics occur at a much faster time scale
than changes in the equilibrium priceW , or the return on the safe investment g, the latter
two variables can be assumed to be constant. Chiarella’s model is, therefore, defined by
the following set of differential equations:
P˙ = a(W − P + h(ψ − g) (13)
ψ˙ = −acP − cψ + ch(ψ − g) + acW (14)
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The steady state of system 14 is given by:
ψ¯ = 0 and P¯ = W + h(−g)/a (15)
The stability of the system can be analyzed in terms of the Jacobian J of system 14,
showing that there is no saddle point behavior, i.e. either a stable equilibrium or a limit
cycle occurs. The condition for stability is:
τ > (b− 1)/a. (16)
Where τ = 1/c. There is, therefore, a clear boundary between stability and limit cycle
behavior that is easily computable. Moreover, the amplitude of the limit cycle can be
calculated analytically from:
A˙ = A(K(A)− aǫ/2)/τ (17)
where A is the amplitude, ǫ = τ − b−1
a
and
K(A) =
1
2
∫
2pi
0
[k′(Asiny)− k′(0)]cos2ydy (18)
where k(x) = h(x− g)− h(−g).
B Network Structures
In all descriptions below networks consist of X vertexes (in this paper X = 100) con-
nected by varying configurations of edges. The network parameters were chosen to give
approximately the same number of edges in different configurations.
B.1 Erdo˝s Re´nyi Random Graph
Are named after the early work of Erdo˝s and Re´nyi (1959). The presence of edges in Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random graphs is determined by a connectivity parameter. The probability of an
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edge existing between any pair of nodes is equally likely. This relatively simple structure
means that many of the properties of these graphs, such as the degree distribution (the
distribution of node connectivity’s), may be determined analytically for large graphs.
Whilst these networks are rarely found in reality their simplicity has resulted in them
being used in studies in many fields. See Newman (2010) for a detailed discussion of their
properties and variants.
These graphs are constructed as follows. For each pairs of nodes i and j the connecting
edge is added with probability p. We consider a range of values of p.
B.2 Completely Connected
In this case every vertex is connected to every other vertex in the network. This may be
considered a special case of the random graph with p = 1. Every trader in the market is
able to interact with every other.
B.3 Core Periphery
Several systems, including inter bank markets (Becher et al., 2008; van Lelyveld and in t
Veld, 2012), are characterized by a core-periphery or hierarchical structure. In this type of
network a proportion of the nodes form a highly connected core. The remaining periphery
nodes are weakly connected to core but there are few if any connections directly between
the periphery nodes. Markets structured in this way contain a group of traders who
all know of and interact with each other. The remaining traders only have one or two
connections to these central parties.
This network structure consist of a core of m nodes which are completely connected.
Each of the remaining X −m periphery nodes is connected to a single randomly chosen
core node. There are no direct connections between periphery nodes. In this paper we
consider m = 30.
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B.4 Scale Free
In scale free networks the degree distribution, the distribution of the number of nodes each
node is connected to, follows a power law. This means that there are many nodes with
very few connections and a small number of nodes with very large numbers of connections.
There are many real world networks which have this type of structure for instance citation
networks and the world wide web. These networks are also seen in economic systems, for
instance Sorama¨ki et al. (2007) finds that the network of payments on the FedWire Funds
system follows a scale free distribution. They are characterized by generative processes
often based on preferential attachment. This means that individuals are more likely to
connect to other individuals who are already well connected. There has been a great
deal of research in this area both in identifying examples of scale free networks and
understanding the manner in which they come about. For a recent review see Newman
(2010)
To generate scale free networks we use the preferential attachment model of Albert
and Baraba´si (2002). The algorithm for generating these networks is given below (as
presented by Baraba´si and Albert, 1999) The graph starts with a core of m0 nodes which
are completely connected. Nodes are then added to the network one at a time. When
a node is added m (such that m ≤ m0) connections are made to existing nodes. The
probability of the new node being connected to an existing node i is xi∑X
i=1
xi
where xi is
the number of edges connected to vertex i. As such nodes with more connections are
likely to gain further connections. Here we consider m = m0 = 5.
B.5 Ring
The ring is a regular network structure. Whilst not a realistic structure it provides a
useful baseline as a market with low connectivity and high separation between traders.
The network is constructed as follows. Consider the nodes arranged in a circle. Each
trader is connected to the N nodes immediately to the left and N nodes immediately to
the right.
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B.6 Local Structure
This network consists of several groups of nodes. Each group is strongly connected inter-
nally but weakly connected to other groups. We can liken this to a market with several
sub-markets. The majority of traders only trade in one of these submarkets. Those that
trade in more than one tend to trade in submarkets which are close in some dimension.
Formally we consider N groups each containing X/N nodes. The vertexes in each group
form a completely connected graph. These groups are arranged in a circle. Each group is
connected to the adjacent group to the left and right. For each connection M members of
the group are chosen at random and connected to each of M randomly chosen members
of the other group. No node may be chosen to be connected to both adjacent groups. In
this paper we use N = 10 and M = 2.
B.7 Small World
Small world networks have received much attention in the scientific and popular literature.
They typically feature multiple cliques of densely connected nodes which are connected
by a small number of edges. In network theoretic terms this means that in comparison to
random graphs they have relatively high clustering coefficients and a relatively low average
path lengths. These type of properties are found in many systems including science
collaboration networks and power networks (Albert and Baraba´si, 2002). It is relatively
easy to extend the example given for local structure to include short cut connections
by the addition of a small number of traders willing to trade over long distances in the
separated markets.
There are many algorithms for generating small world networks (e.g. Watts and Stro-
gatz, 1998). In this paper the small world networks are based on the local network
described above. After the local network is constructed S additional edges are added.
For each edge, two disconnected vertexes are randomly selected with uniform probability
and an edge is added between them. In this paper we consider S = 5.
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Figure 1: Figures (a)-(d) show data from the same simulation. Figure (a) shows the average
logarithmic valuations of all traders. Figure (b) the average valuation in black whilst all other
lines are the individual valuations of a sample of chartists. Figure (c) shows the average valuation
of all traders (dashed line) and the trade price at each point in time (solid line). Figure (d)
shows the average of the local valuations for all traders (dashed line), the trade volume at each
period (dotted line) and a 100 period moving average of the trade volume (solid line). In all
cases a = 1.0, b = 4.0 and c = 1.0. The network is a Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with 100 nodes
and probability of connection equal to 0.1.
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Figure 2: Figures (a)-(d) show data from the same simulation. Figure (a) shows the average
logarithmic valuations of all traders. Figure (b) the average valuation in black whilst all other
lines are the individual valuations of a sample of chartists. Figure (c) shows the average valuation
of all traders (dashed line) and the trade price at each point in time (solid line). Figure (d)
shows the average of the local valuations for all traders (dashed line), the trade volume at each
period (dotted line) and a 100 period moving average of the trade volume (solid line). In all
cases a = 1.0, b = 4.0 and c = 1.0. The network is a Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with 100 nodes
and probability of connection equal to 0.6.
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Figure 3: Graph showing the percentage of runs exhibiting steady state dynamics for parameters
a = 1.0, b = 4.0 and c = 0.7 and for varying levels of connectivity within Erdo˝s-Re´nyi markets.
Each data point is calculated over 100 repetitions for each of 1000 networks (100,000 simulations
for each point). Max (Non-)Steady is the fraction of runs exhibiting (non-)steady state dynamics
for the network structure with the greatest proportion of (non-)steady state dynamics across the
observed networks. i.e. out of the 1000 networks it is the highest fraction of the 100 observations
exhibiting (non-) steady state behavior.
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Figure 4: Fraction of simulations which result in a steady state dynamic (white indicates 100%,
black 0%) for different values of connectivity and population composition Pc. In all cases a = 1.0,
b = 4.0 and c = 1.0.
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Figure 5: Each graph shows the fraction of simulations which result in a steady state dynamic
(white indicates 100%, black 0%) for different values of a and b. Figures show the statistics for
different values of c and different network structures. Grey line indicates the boundary of the
region (below and to the right) of stability under the Chiarella model.
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Figure 6: Each graph shows the amplitude of cycles for different market structures, along with
the value for the Chiarella model. Figures show the statistics for different values of a and b. All
results averaged over those runs of 100,000 simulations not resulting in steady state dynamics.
Amplitude of zero indicates all runs were steady state. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Core Erdo˝s Scale Small
Complete Periphery Re´nyi Free Torus Local World
Connections 4950 505 495 485 500 480 485
0.10 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
0.20 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
0.30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.982 1.000 0.999
0.40 1.000 1.000 0.993 1.000 0.847 0.999 0.968
0.50 1.000 0.997 0.838 1.000 0.505 0.976 0.902
0.60 0.995 0.951 0.482 0.932 0.162 0.925 0.804
0.70 0.825 0.690 0.128 0.690 0.026 0.853 0.733
0.80 0.536 0.352 0.027 0.361 0.000 0.765 0.654
0.90 0.213 0.096 0.001 0.091 0.000 0.668 0.564
1.00 0.054 0.031 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.549 0.412
Table 1: Fraction of runs showing steady state dynamics for different market structures and
values of c. Results calculated over 100 repetitions for each of 1000 instantiations of each
market type. In all cases Pc = 0.5, a = 1.0 and b = 4.0. The number of connections in each
market are also shown.
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Core Erdo˝s Scale Small
c Complete Periphery Re´nyi Free Torus Local World
0.10 - - - - - - -
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - )
0.20 - - - - - - -
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - )
0.30 - - - - 0.000 - 0.000
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) (0.001) ( - ) (0.000)
0.40 - - 0.000 - 0.005 0.000 0.001
( - ) ( - ) (0.001) ( - ) (0.019) (0.000) (0.001)
0.50 - 0.000 0.006 - 0.026 0.000 0.002
( - ) (0.000) (0.020) ( - ) (0.041) (0.000) (0.002)
0.60 0.000 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.067 0.000 0.010
(0.000) (0.007) (0.063) (0.001) (0.062) (0.001) (0.004)
0.70 0.004 0.009 0.097 0.014 0.119 0.001 0.015
(0.002) (0.026) (0.089) (0.004) (0.067) (0.002) (0.003)
0.80 0.028 0.038 0.164 0.050 0.165 0.001 0.020
(0.007) (0.056) (0.084) (0.010) (0.064) (0.004) (0.004)
0.90 0.073 0.084 0.212 0.103 0.199 0.003 0.026
(0.012) (0.076) (0.069) (0.014) (0.059) (0.007) (0.005)
1.00 0.126 0.133 0.242 0.156 0.224 0.005 0.037
(0.015) (0.076) (0.058) (0.015) (0.057) (0.012) (0.073)
Table 2: Absolute difference between trade price and fundamental value for different market
structures and values of c. Standard deviations in parentheses. Results calculated for those
cases not exhibiting steady state dynamics from 100 repetitions for each of 1000 instantiations
of each market type. In all cases Pc = 0.5, a = 1.0 and b = 4.0. All values are statistically
different at the 99% level from those of all other markets for the same value of c and from those
for the same market with different c with the exception of the Erdo˝s Re´nyi and Torus network
for c = 0.8 which is significant at the 95% level.
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Core Erdo˝s Scale Small
c Complete Periphery Re´nyi Free Torus Local World
0.10 - - - - - - -
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - )
0.20 - - - - - - -
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - )
0.30 - - - - 0.000 - 0.000
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) (0.002) ( - ) (0.000)
0.40 - - 0.000 - 0.009 0.000 0.002
( - ) ( - ) (0.001) ( - ) (0.031) (0.000) (0.002)
0.50 - 0.000 0.007 - 0.040 0.000 0.004
( - ) (0.001) (0.023) ( - ) (0.063) (0.002) (0.003)
0.60 0.000 0.001 0.042 0.001 0.095 0.001 0.016
(0.000) (0.008) (0.071) (0.001) (0.084) (0.005) (0.006)
0.70 0.005 0.012 0.110 0.016 0.158 0.003 0.025
(0.002) (0.032) (0.099) (0.005) (0.084) (0.010) (0.006)
0.80 0.031 0.050 0.184 0.056 0.209 0.006 0.035
(0.008) (0.071) (0.093) (0.011) (0.076) (0.015) (0.008)
0.90 0.081 0.109 0.237 0.114 0.247 0.011 0.047
(0.013) (0.096) (0.076) (0.015) (0.074) (0.024) (0.010)
1.00 0.139 0.173 0.270 0.173 0.277 0.018 0.064
(0.016) (0.095) (0.063) (0.016) (0.084) (0.034) (0.108)
Table 3: Volatility of trade price for different market structures and values of c. Standard
deviations in parentheses. Results calculated for those cases not exhibiting steady state dynamics
from 100 repetitions for each of 1000 instantiations of each market type. In all cases Pc = 0.5,
a = 1.0 and b = 4.0. All values are statistically different at the 99% level from those of all other
markets for the same value of c and from those for the same market with different c. The only
exceptions are the core-periphery and scale free markets for c = 1.0 and core-periphery and local
markets for c = 0.6 which are not significant.
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Core Erdo˝s Scale Small
c Complete Periphery Re´nyi Free Torus Local World
0.10 - - - - - - -
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - )
0.20 - - - - - - -
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - )
0.30 - - - - 0.007 - 0.004
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) (0.007) ( - ) (0.001)
0.40 - - 0.006 - 0.024 0.001 0.020
( - ) ( - ) (0.006) ( - ) (0.033) (0.001) (0.004)
0.50 - 0.006 0.026 0.025 0.037 0.001 0.011
( - ) (0.006) 0.037) 0.003) 0.045) 0.001) 0.004)
0.60 0.005 0.016 0.051 0.072 0.057 0.002 0.023
(0.001) (0.027) (0.068) (0.021) (0.052) (0.002) (0.010)
0.70 0.018 0.026 0.080 0.180 0.088 0.002 0.022
(0.008) (0.041) (0.074) (0.088) (0.051) (0.003) (0.010)
0.80 0.047 0.051 0.120 0.308 0.119 0.003 0.023
(0.025) (0.064) (0.065) (0.155) (0.046) (0.004) (0.011)
0.90 0.071 0.078 0.151 0.438 0.144 0.004 0.024
(0.031) (0.071) (0.052) (0.137) (0.043) (0.006) (0.012)
1.00 0.100 0.114 0.172 0.607 0.163 0.005 0.026
(0.025) (0.067) (0.046) (0.091) (0.040) (0.008) (0.040)
Table 4: Average trade volume per link, per period for different market structures and values of
c. Standard deviations in parentheses. Results calculated for those cases not exhibiting steady
state dynamics from 100 repetitions for each of 1000 instantiations of each market type. In all
cases Pc = 0.5, a = 1.0 and b = 4.0. All values are statistically different at the 99% level from
those of all other markets for the same value of c and from those for the same market with
different c.
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Asset Riskless Core Erdo˝s Scale Small
Volatility Volatility Complete Periphery Re´nyi Free Torus Local World
0.000 0.000 0.139 0.173 0.270 0.173 0.277 0.018 0.064
(0.016) (0.095) (0.063) (0.016) (0.084) (0.034) (0.108)
0.001 0.000 0.149 0.205 0.276 0.178 0.277 0.120 0.144
(0.161) (0.227) (0.281) (0.180) (0.277) (0.133) (0.164)
0.002 0.000 0.190 0.239 0.292 0.202 0.290 0.183 0.198
(0.198) (0.253) (0.297) (0.210) (0.298) (0.193) (0.211)
0.000 0.000 0.139 0.173 0.270 0.173 0.277 0.018 0.064
(0.016) (0.095) (0.063) (0.016) (0.084) (0.034) (0.108)
0.000 0.001 0.226 0.238 0.244 0.224 0.255 0.203 0.213
(0.232) (0.246) (0.249) (0.230) (0.262) (0.209) (0.221)
0.000 0.002 0.296 0.306 0.299 0.294 0.306 0.258 0.265
(0.301) (0.312) (0.303) (0.298) (0.312) (0.264) (0.271)
Table 5: Volatility of trade price for different market structures and volatilities of riskless asset
return and fundamental value. Results calculated over 100 repetitions for each of 1000 instan-
tiations of each market type. In all cases Pc = 0.5, a = 1.0, b = 4.0 and c = 1.0. The effects of
changes to risky and riskless asset volatilities on market volatility is significant at the 99% level
for all cases except for the effect of asset volatility increasing between 0.000 and 0.001 on the
Torus network.
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